There has been significant interest in studying security games for modeling the interplay of attacks and defenses on various systems involving critical infrastructure, financial system security, political campaigns, and civil safeguarding. However, existing security game models typically either assume additive utility functions, or that the attacker can attack only one target. Such assumptions lead to tractable analysis, but miss key inherent dependencies that exist among different targets in current complex networks. In this paper, we generalize the classical security game models to allow for non-additive utility functions. We also allow attackers to be able to attack multiple targets. We examine such a general security game from a theoretical perspective and provide a unified view. In particular, we show that each security game is equivalent to a combinatorial optimization problem over a set system ε, which consists of defender's pure strategy space. The key technique we use is based on the transformation, projection of a polytope, and the ellipsoid method. This work settles several open questions in security game domain and extends the state-of-the-art of both the polynomial solvable and NP-hard class of the security game.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we study the classic security game model [2] when attacker has multiple resources and utility functions are non-additive. More specifically, we wonder how the following questions that are well understood in the case of single attacker resource and additive utility functions can be addressed in this general case: (1) how to compactly represent the security game with multiple attacker resources and the non-additive utility functions? (2) how to efficiently solve such a compactly represented game? (3) what is the Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s 
MAIN RESULTS
To answer these questions, we provide the following contributions: (1) we first propose a polytope transformation and projection framework to equivalently and compactly represent the zero-sum and non-additive security game with only poly(n) variables; (2) We prove that the problem of determining the Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum and non-additive security game and the problem of optimizing a Pseudo Boolean function over a set system ε can be reduced to each other in polynomial time. (3) We then apply our framework to the non-zero-sum and non-additive security game, and further obtain a similar result that determining the strong Stackelberg equilibrium and the above combinatorial optimization problem is equivalent. (4) Finally, we examine the Nash equilibrium in the non-zero-sum but additive security game. We prove that determining the Nash equilibrium can be reduced to the linear optimization over a set system ε.
CONCLUSIONS
These results demonstrate that the security game with non-additive utility function and multiple attacker resource is essentially a combinatorial problem, and provide a systematic framework to transform the game-theoretical problem to the problem of combinatorial algorithm design. Further, our results not only answers the questions proposed in the security game domain [1, 4] , but also extends significantly both the polynomial solvable and NP-hard class. The full version of the paper is available at [3] .
